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P r o f . M a r e k  Z d e b e l
Fa c u l t y  o f  L a w  a n d  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S i l e s i a
GENERAL TAX INTERPRETATION IN POLAND 
- SELECTED LEGAL FINANCIAL ISSUES
Regardless o f the country of origin of the tax law, it always remains the interfer­
ence law. It is meant to create social relationships non-existing beyond it1. The es­
sence of these relationships demonstrates itself in the fact, that state representations 
imposing the obligation of tax performance upon a particular subject do not estab­
lish a simultaneous obligation of ensuring an immediate reciprocal performance for 
the subject benefit from the side o f state or any local administrative unit2.
A specific character of the legal tie, that is being established between the address­
ee of norm -  a taxpayer /in some cases also with other subjects, i.e. other taxpayers, 
collectors or successors in right / and a legislator demands the acceptance of, on the 
one hand for the needs of tax law a closed system of sources and, on the other hand, 
the conditions of their interpretation (taking into consideration that legal norms re­
sulting for the system of sources are not always transparent in spite of aiming at such 
transparency). The issue becomes crucial wherever, beside the local legal regulations, 
the subjects are obliged to use norms of foreign law as well. In the conditions of Po­
land or other countries that are the members o f the European Union it implies that 
using the tax law and explaining its contents procedure should be based on respect­
ing both constitution resolutions as well as norms of the European Union law.
The indicated conditioning of actions that aim at the establishment o f tax norms 
essence, allows to form the opinion that those actions will be to a great extent based 
on the usage of static elements, i.e. “following the letter o f the law”3. However, it 
must not shadow the fact that considering the exceptionally tight relationship be­
tween tax law and economy, thus in nature a very dynamic phenomenon, the appli­
cation of law can not be limited to the interpretation merely based on the wording 
of the regulation -  its grammatical interpretation. It also has to refer to the extral- 
inguistic interpretation of law, above all the systemic one and the one indicating the 
way of attaining a goal (the teleological one).
Dilemmas concerning the admissibility of the application of linguistic and extral- 
inguistic interpretations in the area of tax law norms determine the reflection of the 
conflict between two concepts of interpretation of legal acts: the clarification con­
cept and the derivative one4. According to what has already been stated above, in 
the understanding of Polish doctrine of tax law, the opinion about the relevance of 
applying the latter concept prevails. It is so, above all, since it remains convergent
1 See: R. Mastalski, Prawo podatkowe, Warszawa 2006, p. 110.
2 Ibidem.
3 See: B. Brzezinski, Wstqp do nauki prawa podatkowego, Torun 2003, p. 189 and the following; R. Mas­
talski, Prawo, op.cit., p. 110.
4 See: B. Brzezinski, Wstgp, op.cit., p. 192.
with the postulate of carrying on the interpretation until the moment of obtaining 
the full clarity of the content o f the analyzed norm. This is done not only on the ba­
sis of literal interpretation. Therefore, it determines the rejection of the postulate of: 
“limiting the interpretative activity to the establishment o f meaning of legal text on 
the basis o f linguistic interpretation rules and contenting oneself on its results”5.
It is beyond any doubts, that there are no arguments for the standpoint that the 
above mentioned rules do not concern the totality o f subjects undertaking the in­
terpretation of the provisions o f tax law. Therefore, the obligation of applying them 
should exist both when they are promulgated by the Minister of Finance (later called 
MF) and other official tax agencies together with the motion put forward by an au­
thorized person.
In the margin of indicated issues, it needs to be pointed out that in practice there 
is no unequivocal terminology denoting activities and actions undertaken in order 
to clarify contents o f tax law norms. It regards in particular the already mentioned 
terms: “interpretation of legal acts” and “interpretation of law”. Usually they are treat­
ed as synonyms, because, in particular cases they have a very similar significative 
range. From the semantic point o f view, however, it is necessary to perceive differ­
ences in between them and to agree in this respect with the idea of B. Brzezinski. Ac­
cording to that author, “interpretation” refers to searching for meaning of the text of 
normative acts, whereas “commentary” encompasses both interpretations and draw­
ing logical consequences from the norms established in the procedure of interpre­
tation, i.e. drawing conclusions from norms about norms, as well as closing the so 
called “gaps in the law”6.
Such an understanding of the notion “commentary of the law” allows him to as­
sign different law sources functions simultaneously ensuring an indispensable com­
municativeness.
In the science of financial law and judicature a distinct view is also represented i.e. 
that the regulations o f the tax law7 do not characterize themselves with any unusu­
al “canon“ of methods o f the law commentary. This means that making a commen­
tary on the tax law regulations the same methods o f commentary (interpretation) 
should be used as in other spheres o f law. That point o f view should be discussed, 
however, indicating that it is their certain specifics that decides about the range of 
the commentary on the tax law regulations. It manifests in particular attitudes and 
expectations towards the result of the commentaryAThis standpoint does not op­
pose the relevant idea of T. D^bowska-Romanowska.that interpretation does not de­
termine the source of law and is not treated by constitution in this way9. The effect 
it brings about is the fact that it can not influence neither creating nor cancellation 
of the laws and duties resulting from tax regulations.
5 See: B. Brzezinski, Wstgp, op.cit., p. 192 and the following.
6 See: B. Brzezinski, Wstgp, op.cit., p. 189.
7 See: art 3 o f the law of 29th August 1997 Tax regulations Journal of Laws No 160, pos. 1083 with 
changes./later: t.r./.
8 According to B. Brzezinski it constitutes the consequence o f the fact, that the institution of tax lim­
its the property law, that is the value constitutionally protected in Poland -  see: B. Brzezinski, Wstgp, 
op.cit., p. 191.
9 See: T. D^bowska-Romanowska, Obliczaniepodatku a gwarancjepraw obywatelskich, P i P 1998, No
The brought to mind rules o f tax law regulations commentary usage, though not 
determined by those regulations interchangeably, should find reflection in their con­
tents. The issue becomes more visible if the fact is taken into consideration, that the 
normalization of tax law anticipate the application of the institutional commentary 
on the legal regulations both with reference to individual cases as well as general 
ones, including all the persons obliged, that have identical features.
The present work has been devoted to selected legal financial issues resulting from 
the application of one of the institutionalized options of tax law interpretation in Po­
land, the general interpretation established by the Minister o f Finance. The basic ar­
gument supporting the advisability o f undertaking the subjective analysis is the fact, 
that the solutions of the Polish law that are in force regards the issue, despite frequent 
modifications, have not created a satisfactory mechanism of the tax law norms in­
terpretation in a general sense, independent from a concrete factual state included 
in the decision of tax agency.
In the light of the current wording of tax regulations -  art. 14 a, the minister appro­
priate for the cases of public finances, aims at ensuring a homogenous application of 
tax law. This is done by tax agencies and financial inspection agencies, making a de­
tailed interpretation, taking into account judicial decisions as well the decisions of 
Constitutional Tribunal and the European Tribunal of Justice (general interpretation). 
Those interpretations are published without any delay in The Official Gazette o f the 
Ministry o f Finances and placed in the Bulletin of Public Information -  art. 14 i.
Until their introduction into the binding normalization, the subjective legal so­
lutions had undergone several modifications. Here, it should also be remarked, that 
the idea o f informing the taxpayers about the binding law had been considered al­
ready before the date o f coming into force o f the tax regulations. It has been drawn 
out of the contents o f the regulation of the article 9 of code of administrative pro­
cedure. The rule was transformed in the tax regulations by the law of art. 121 par. 2 
for the taxpayers disadvantage because it limits the duties o f the tax agency regards 
giving information and explaining the questions indispensable for the tax procedure 
needs and only in connection with the subject o f that procedure10.
The interpretation which is mentioned in the regulation art. 14 a of tax regula­
tions reaches out the duties imposed upon tax agencies -  giving help to the persons 
obliged (taxpayers)11. It also serves the tax agencies, even when self calculation of 
tax is not used12.
In the original wording, tax regulations imposed upon the MF the duty of aiming at 
homogenous application of law by tax agencies and the agencies o f financial inspec­
tion particularly by making its official interpretation, taking into account the judicial 
decisions and the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal. According to B. Adamiak 
this determined limitations o f the independence of the agency, appropriate to make
10 See: J. Zimmermann, Ordynacja podatkowa. Komentarz. Postgpowanie podatkowe, Torun 1998, p. 19 
and the following.
11 the directives regarding interpretation are called in France: “administrative tax doctrines” -  see 
L. Vapaille, La doctrine administrative fiscale, Paris-Montreal 1999; H. Dzwonkowski, Z. Zgierski, Pro- 
cedury podatkowe, Warszawa 2006, p. 131.
12 For instance during the interwar period in Poland -  see J. Kulicki, Zasady, tryb, i skutki prawne in- 
terpretacji prawa podatkowego. Information 1128 Chancellery of Seym Feb., 2005, p. 1.
judicial decisions in a specific case13. That normalization underwent amending with 
the regulations o f the law of the 12th of September 2002 about the change of the law 
”tax regulations” and about the change of some other laws14. The amending intro­
duced the rule that the interpretations o f MF should be directed to tax agencies and 
financial inspection agencies, they should refer to tax law problems and bind speci­
fied agencies regarding judicial decisions making. In the literature on the subject that 
normalization underwent a far more detailed critics in the name of protection of in­
terests o f the person obliged against the lawlessness o f tax agencies15. The doctrine 
reproached legal subjective solutions also with the fact that it determined a limita­
tion of independence of the agencies responsible for judicial decisions, because they 
were bound by official interpretation. The presented legal state was to have a nega­
tive influence upon the taxpayer’s rights, as it deprived him in practice of the right 
for a two instances system procedure.16
From the point o f view of proper legislation the appointed solution was criticized 
as contradicted with the regulation of the art. 78 of the Constitution, i.e. violating the 
rule of the two instances system17, but, when local government tax agencies judicial 
decisions concerning tax were meant, it was accepted, that the solution violated both 
the cardinal rule of the local government units independence (expressed in the regu­
lation of the art.16 of the law 2) and the tax control attributed to them18.
The negative evaluation of the appointed normalization was definitely confirmed 
by the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of the 11th of May 2004, according to 
which the regulation of art. 14 par. 2 of tax regulations in the part constituting, that 
the interpretation of MF that binds tax agencies is in discordance with the regulation 
of the art. 78 and 93 of the law 2 of the Constitution19. This fact, as well as the regu­
lations introduced with the art. 10 o f the law of July, 2nd 2004 about freedom of eco­
nomic activity20 (authorizing the entrepreneur to apply to the appropriate tax agency 
for an opinion regarding the range and manner o f the usage of regulations of which 
results his obligation to render a public tribute), basically changed the conditions of 
making interpretation by the MF -  art. 14 par. 1 o f the tax regulations21. Above all, 
it meant the lack of legal basis justifying the practice that the MF held de facto the 
powers to make interpretation of tax law in the mode of art. 14 par. 1 pt. 2 in cases of
13 See: B. Adamiak, Model dwuinstancyjnoscipostgpowania podatkowego, P i P 1998 no 2; A. Jedlinska, 
O tak zwanej urzydowej interpretacji prawa podatkowego, Rejent 2001, no 12, p. 60.
14 Journal of Laws, No 169, pos. 1387.
15 See: J. Gluminska-Pawlic, Wiqzqce interpretacje podatkowe w orzecznictwie samorzqdowych organow 
podatkowych, Mon. Pod. 2005, no 6, p. 29.
16 See: C. Kosikowski, H. Dzwonkowski, A. Huchla: Ustawa ordynacja podatkowa. Komentarz, Warszawa 
2000, p. 65; J. Gluminska-Pawlic, Urzgdowa interpretacja prawa podatkowego a orzecznictwo samorzqdowych 
organow podatkowych, in: Polski system podatkowy. Zalozenia i praktyka, Lublin 2004, p. 474 and the fol­
lowing.
17 See: R. Zelwianski, Wqtpliwe zmiany w ordynacji podatkowej i ustawie o Naczelnym Sqdzie Admin- 
istracyjnym, Prz. Pod. 2003, No 4, p. 52 and the following. The opposite post was held by H. Dworniak, 
who considered the introduced changes appropriate -  see H. Dworniak, Ordynacja podatkowa. Komen- 
tarz, Warszawa 2003, p. 24.
18 See: J. Gluminska-Pawlic, Urzgdowe, op.cit., p. 30.
19 Sign., K4/03 Journal of Laws No 122, pos 1288; see also B. Brzezinski, Wst$p, op.cit., p. 137.
20 Journal of Laws of 2007, No 155, pos. 1095 with changes.
21 Law o f June, 30th, 2005. Journal of Laws No 143, pos. 1199 with change.
individual tax payers and collectors. At present, such powers are given to the MF22, 
but on the basis o f a separate regulation of the art. 14 o f tax regulations.
Following one after another tax regulations amendments regarding the condi­
tions o f giving general interpretation (official one) up to the present moment have 
not eliminated however, the doubts concerning the aims and conditions o f usage of 
the institution in question.
Further in this work, there have been presented selected issues connected with the 
signalized above legal doubts.
One of the most important of them and connected with the usage of the regula­
tion of art. 14 a is undoubtedly the issue of “circumstances and prerequisites* o f giv­
ing the general interpretation. Undertaking an attempt o f giving an answer to such 
a stated problem it should be indicated at first that MF making an interpretation of 
tax regulations law acts only in such a range and direction that he will consider ad- 
visable.23 On the other hand, however, taking into account the art. 14 a, it should be 
underlined, that the basic target of giving an interpretation by MF is aiming at ensur­
ing homogeneity of tax law usage by the subjects to whom it was directed. The legis­
lator’s use o f the term “homogeneity” leads to a conclusion, that the subjective inter­
pretation has any sense only in case when a discrepancy excluding that homogeneity 
appears in the practice of using the law.24 Thus, these will be such factual and le­
gal states when tax or financial control agencies dealing with the same type of cas­
es pass different judgments 25.
Discussing the signalized issues, the attention should be paid to one more of their 
aspects. Namely, the wording o f the appointed regulation (with the use of the gener­
al interpretation directive, concerning tax law regulations that, it can not have an ex­
tending character), orders to accept, that the discrepancies can refer to judicial deci­
sions activity of the same type of agency. Thus, they will determine the basis to give 
the official interpretation by MF, when the discrepancies will appear in judicial de­
cisions o f tax or financial control agencies and will not determine such a basis when 
the judicial decisions line of tax agencies will be different than the line of the admin­
istrative courts or common courts o f law judicial decisions. Wherever such discrep­
ancies are not registered there is no foundation for giving the interpretation26.
Wondering about the character o f prerequisites that can evoke the need of giv­
ing an official interpretation, it can not be eliminated, that they might be the result 
of control o f the usage of law by subjects subordinate to MF27.
22 See: J. Krawczyk, M. Gumala, P. Jablonowski, Ordynacja Podatkowa. Komentarz do nowelizacji, 
Warszawa 2006, p. 42.
23 Ibidem.
24 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja 
podatkowa. Komentarz, Warszawa 2006, p. 129.
25 There is an idea represented in literature that the lack of homogeneity can also be spoken about 
when there are the same judgments, but based on different commentary of the same regulations -  see: 
S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja, op.cit.,
p. 81.
26 Ibidem.
27 See. C. Kosikowski, L. Etel, E. Ruskowski, Kontrola tworzenia i stosowania prawa podatkowego pod 
rzqdami konstytucji, Warszawa 2006, p. 110.
Justified doubts regard the laws of tax regulations in the question of passing judg­
ments whether the general interpretation based on the art. 14 a can be issued only by 
the minister appropriate for public finances cases -  Minister o f Finance -  the gram­
mar commentary on the law would appeal for that, or is the deviation of such rule 
admissible in specific cases. The latter would have a particular sense if, o f the ob­
jective reasons, the MF could not temporally perform his duties. The legal basis for 
such a standpoint seems to be created by the regulation of the art. 36 of the law of 
the 8th of August 1996 about the Council of Ministers28. It says about the possibili­
ty of realization of powers serving the MF by persons entitled to deputize for him. 
However, the acceptance of the appointed legal norm as the basis for analysis of the 
discussed issue would signify, that the MF would not be able to authorize effective­
ly other persons (ex his secretary) to make interpretations29.
A much more serious problem from the point o f view of the exerted effects is the 
question whether the initiative o f giving subjective interpretations serves only the 
MF. The discussed laws of tax regulations do not explain interchangeably such a stat­
ed issue, the literature on the subject, anyhow, presents contrasting ideas. According 
to one of them, assuming that the regulation of the art. 14 a (previously art 14 par. 1 
pt. 2 o f tax regulations) says about the official interpretation, the initiative of giving 
a general interpretation serves only the MF.
According to the opposite standpoint it can be also be given on application of 
the interested subject not being at the same time an interpretation in an individu­
al case30. Considering a reasonable, the other o f the mentioned types o f standpoints 
would result in creating further doubts regarding the specification of what subjects 
and in what mood could be given a general interpretation.
These doubts and grammar analysis of the regulation of art. 14a as well as the reg­
ulations binding previously, make one thus accept, as the appropriate one, a “com­
promise concept”. Therefore, making interpretation by MF should have basically an 
official usage, because, neither the currently binding regulation, nor the regulations 
valid previously predict the application for such an interpretation.31 Since, howev­
er, the appointed regulations do not include a strict interdiction of putting forward 
such a motion, it is not inadmissible. Accepting such a point of view would let one 
agree that such a motion could be put forward not only by tax agencies or financial 
control agencies but also the subjects interested in passing a judgment, though not 
having the status o f a tax agency. In the light of the regulation of the art. 14b-14e of 
tax regulations the circle o f such subjects would be limited, though32. An additional 
issue that should be discussed, accepting as the binding one the last o f the proposed 
solutions, would be the necessity of establishing a legal character of the motion of
28 Journal of Laws of 2003. No 24, pos. 199 with changes.
29 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hausner, A. Kubat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynac­
ja , op.cit., p. 87.
30 See: R. Kubacki, Urzgdowe interpretacjeprawa podatkowego -  pozorna korzysc, Prz. Pod. 1998, No 8, 
p. 27.
31 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kubat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja, 
op.cit., p. 76.
32 See: C. Kosikowski, L. Etel, R. Dowgier, PPietrasz, S. Presnarowicz, Ordynacja podatkowa. Komen- 
tarz, Warszawa 2006, p. 95; S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka- 
Medek, Ordynacja, op.cit., p. 133.
this kind. Not entering any detailed speculations in this area,which would extend 
the subject o f this work, it should be generally taken into account that such motion 
would not have any traits o f application in the understanding of the art. 168 of tax 
regulations. It would have the characteristics o f a typical “signaling” of the existing 
doubts regarding specific issues of tax law, the explanation of which is indispensa­
ble, in order to provide its homogenous usage33. The consequences of the acceptance 
of this type of interpretation would be, however, predictable. Above all, it should be 
admitted that, putting the motion forward would not impose upon the MF the ob­
ligation of the motion investigation in a specified period of time34.
Examining the problem of usage of the regulation of art. 14 a of t.r. from the point 
of view of tax agencies functioning it is also necessary to mention the question of 
the sources of laws, which should be used while making an interpretation, the form 
of their publication as well as legal consequences of their edition for tax agencies (fi­
nancial control agencies) or other subjects participating in the legal tax system re­
lations.
Analyzing the first of the exposed issues it should be indicated that, on the ground 
of the quoted regulation of art. 14 a o f t.r. /and both in the original wording, as well 
as, currently binding/ MF while making an interpretation of tax law is obliged to 
take into account the content of the judicial decisions in this scope. These judicial 
decisions have a domestic scope: the judicial decisions of Polish courts and the Con­
stitutional Tribunal and of the extra-domestic one -  decisions of the European Tri­
bunal o f Justice /further: ETJ/, indicating that, the order of categories o f judgments, 
that should be taken into consideration, can not be concluded from the contents of 
the discussed regulations.
Grammar interpretation of a regulation seems to appeal for a widespread usage of 
the achievements of judicature within the usage of law even when the judicial deci­
sions are not homogenous as far as the rule is concerned 35. This type of interpreta­
tion, in the light of what was mentioned at the beginning of the present work can not 
be considered satisfactory. The advisability and systemic interpretations thus should 
be helpful. These ones, however lead to a conclusion, that MF giving a general in­
terpretation should at first consider the resolutions specifying legal issues as well as 
ideas expressed in particular judicial decisions which are commonly accepted by the 
benches in given cases o f other domestic courts. Using the judicial decision to make 
an accomplishment o f ETJ should dominate in situations when given issues are reg­
ulated entirely or in a crucial part by the commonwealth law36.
The regulation of art 14 par. 1 of t.r. imposes upon the MF the obligation of pub­
lication of the interpretation in the Official Gazette o f the Ministry of Finance. This 
bears the question about the legal character of the interpretation since it should be 
placed in that kind of promulgation act. The question arises, however, what legal
33 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja, 
op.cit., p. 80; C. Kosikowski, H. Dzwonkowski, A. Huchla, Ordynacja, op.cit., p. 77.
34 See: C. Kosikowski, L. Etel, R. Dowgier, P. Pietrasz, S. Presnarowicz, Ordynacja, op.cit., p. 95.
35 See: C. Kosikowski, H. Dzwonkowski, A. Huchla, Ustawa, op.cit., p. 78; J. Gluchowski: Polskie prawo 
podatkowe, Warszawa 2004, p. 23.
36 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, H. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja, 
op.cit., p. 89; C. Kosikowski, Interpretacje art. 14 ordynacji podatkowej, Glosa 1999, No p1; R. Kubecki, 
Urzgdowe, op.cit., p. 27.
consequences it will have in case the subjects refer to it, knowing its contents from 
other sources. The answer to such an asked question, taking into account the aim of 
the discussed institution should be interchangeable i.e. that the appointed regulation 
does not exclude the law of the subject,who adjusted his procedure to the contents 
of the interpretation,though it was not published 37. Beside the risen argument, the 
accuracy of the presented standpoint is supported by a strictly “informative” char­
acter of such type of publications38.
What refers to the obligation of the announcement of the publication, the com­
monly used regulations should be used, i.e., above all, o f the law of July, 20th, 2000 
about the publication of normative acts and some other legal acts39. The necessity 
of using the regulations of the mentioned law if there is no separate legal regulation 
concerning the moment of the interpretation coming into force, anyway, obliges the 
subject to use general regulations in this scope. According to them, the acts placed 
in the Official Gazette come into force after their promulgation -  art. 440.
On the background of the presented considerations, a uniquely important mean­
ing from the point of view of legal results (that the usage of the general interpreta­
tion implies for parties o f tax law relations) has the issue of “binding force” o f the 
subjective interpretation. As it was indicated above the legislator withdrew from the 
earlier wording of the regulation -  art. 14 par. 2. o f t.r. which established, that, the of­
ficial interpretation binds tax agencies and financial control agencies, because that 
solution was considered inconsistent with the Constitution. At present, they are “di­
rected” to the above mentioned agencies. The wording of regulation thus, neither 
says interchangeably about the uncompromising binding of tax agencies with the 
contents of the official interpretation, nor about the binding with other subjects. In 
connection with that, for the evaluation of a given legal issue -  art. 14 k par.2 will 
have the basic meaning. According to it, the appeal for general interpretation before 
its change41 can not do any harm to the subject that used it, as well as in case of not 
applying it in tax decision making. As a consequence, par. 3 o f the appointed regula­
tion introduces rightly an interdiction of instituting legal procedures in cases of fis­
cal offence or fiscal petty offence and it imposes the obligation of remission of the 
instituted proceedings in these cases and the obligation to assign from counting the 
default interest.
The contents of the called regulation does not justify the standpoint, that the in­
terpretation binds subjects mentioned above. Since that is true, they do not have to 
undergo that interpretation 42. Furthermore, obeying the contents of the interpre­
37 Differently. J. Szczurek, Wiqzqca interpretacja przepisow podatkowych przez organy podatkowe -  
zalozenia oczekiwania, rzeczywistosc, Mon. Pod. 2004, No 2, p. 22.
38 See: C. Kosikowski, H. Dzwonkowski, A. Huchla, Ustawa, op.cit., p. 78; C. Kosikowski, E. Etel, 
E. Ruskowski, Kontrola tworzenia, op.cit., p. 96.
39 Journal of Laws, No 62, pos. 718 with changes.
40 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja, 
op.cit., p. 84.
41 By virtue of the art. 14 e par. 1, the minister appropriate for the cases o f public finances can by vir­
tue of post change the edited general interpretation if he states its incorrectness, taking into account in 
particular the judicial decisions of courts, Constitutional Tribunal or the European Tribunal of Justice.
42 See: A. Glowczewska, Urzgdowe interpretacje i informacje o stosowaniu prawa, Prz. Pod. 2003, No 3, 
p. 45; B. Adamiak, J. Borkowski, R. Mastalski, J. Zubrzycki, Ordynacja, op.cit., p. 102.
tation by the subjects included in the regulation can determine only the justifica­
tion of the demand for the remission of tax arrears -  art. 67 o f t. r. In such a case, 
thus, one can assume, that the two prerequisites included in the regulation are ful­
filled: an important interest o f the taxpayer or the public interest43. It should be un­
derlined here,that there is a different point of view represented in the literature on 
the subject. This means that the change of the general interpretation from binding 
to a non binding one has only a formal character and does not change in the fun­
damental way the crux of that institution 44. That is supported by the contents of 
the regulation of laws of the art. 14 k par. 2 and 14 l o f t. r., which, despite the intro­
duction of the rule, that following tax interpretation can not do any harm45, they do 
not, however, release the obliged from the obligation of tax payment. This happens 
in case, when tax results connected with the event that corresponds with the factu­
al state (which is the subject o f interpretation), take place before making the gener­
al interpretation public.
Among doubts involving the use of the regulation of art. 14 a of t. r. there is finally 
the question of the possible discrepancies between the standpoint of the administra­
tive court in the passed judgement or passed resolution and the contents of interpre­
tation of MF. Deciding about the issue, as it seems, requires reaching for the regula­
tions of the law that normalises the rules o f functioning of the administrative court 
in Poland46. According to them the legal judgement expressed in the judicial deci­
sion o f the court binds, in case when the given office or court whose activities or in­
activity were the subject o f the appeal. In the light of the above there can not be any 
doubts as far as the fact is concerned, that in the case in which the Supreme Admin­
istrative Court passed the judgment or when the resolution was passed both by this 
court and also the tax agency whose appeal was the subject of proceeding (which was 
connected with the legal standpoint of SAC). The rule in question will find its appli­
cation mainly when the resolutions o f this court are revealed because, all the others 
are equipped with the so called “ indirect binding force. This is reflected a.o. in the 
fact that departing from the standpoint included in the given resolution by any ad­
ministrative court bench demands opening a special resolution procedure47.
Summing up the presented above considerations, two conclusions o f general na­
ture should be arrived at. At first it should be underlined, that the regulations of tax 
law referring to the rules o f giving and using the general interpretation by MF from 
a formal point of view are directed to all the tax law using agencies though they would 
not have any status of tax agency or financial control agency. Next, the regulation of
43 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Ordynacja, 
op.cit., p. 85.
44 See: Z. Ofiarski, Kilka uwag o urz^dowych interpretacjach prawa podatkowego dokonywanych przez Min- 
istra Finansow, in: Procedury podatkowe -  gwarancjeprawne, czy instrumenty fiskalizmu, red. H. Dzwon- 
kowski, Biblioteka Monitora Podatkowego, Warszawa 2005, p. 16.
45 See: Judgment of the Regional Administrative Court of Dec., 4th, 2000. I.S.A. I Ka 1414/99 Glosa 
2001, no 5, p. 55; judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of Nov., 7th, 2000, III S.A. 1670/99 
Glosa 2002, no 1, p. 48.
46 Law of July., 25th, 2002, The law about the structure of administrative courts, Journal of Laws No. 
152, pos. 1269 with changes.
47 See: S. Babiarz, D. Dauter, B. Gruszczynski, R. Hauser, A. Kabat, M. Niezgodka-Medek, Komentarz, 
op.cit., p. 93.
art. 14 a of t r. and the following regulations justify the opinion that, in spite o f fre­
quent modifications of the regulations regarding general interpretation, they do not 
determine any precise solution. Their usage bears several interpretive doubts start­
ing from specifying the subject of interpretation through specification of the subject 
authorised to take an initiative of their promulgation up to the evaluation of the re­
sults o f its usage for the persons obliged. In connection with that the presented so­
lutions need further improvement.
The carried out analysis justifies also the conclusion, that, although, since July 2005 
the interpretations o f MF does not formally have a binding character for tax agen­
cies, they influence legal tax decisions in practice. It is the case since the objective of 
that institution has been maintained48.
48 See: H. Dzwonkowski, Z. Zgierski, Procedury, op.cit., p. 136.
